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Abstract 
The paper covers Sino-Pakistan bilateral relations from the establishment of their diplomatic relations to the end of year 
1960. The paper doesn‟t describe the cultural and economic aspects of their bilateral relations in detail. Although there 
were some suspicions and differences between China and Pakistan, but as a whole, the period witnessed for normal 
relations, if not cordial one. The era saw search for making friends in international community by the two states. Both 
the countries took start as independent and sovereign states in the circumstances, when the world was divided into two 
rival blocs. The need for making friends, in the presence of the heydays of Cold War, was the result of their respective 
historical legacies and thereafter, the international system. The Communist China emerged after a long civil war with 
the Nationalists, and Pakistan got independence from the British colonialism. The paper concludes that, for Pakistan, the 
continuing threat and hostilities from India; and for China, the Taiwan issue side by side with the United States‟ policies, 
added a new thinking in the minds of the two states‟ leaders. 
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1. Introduction 
“The early years of independence were dominated by Pakistan‟s problems with the India on the one hand, and the 
efforts to introduce the new state to the world community on the other. The problems it developed with India in the 
immediate aftermath of independence left an indelible impact on its foreign policy and built hostility and distrust into 
Pakistan-India relations. Most of these problems were the product of the partition process, as set out in the 3
rd
 June 1947 
Plan and the Indian Independence Act, July 1947” (Rizvi, 2004). 
For China; “The proclamation of the People‟s Republic of China on 1 October 1949 marked the ending of a civil war 
which had originated more than two decade earlier. The success of the Chinese Communists owed virtually nothing to 
foreign help. During the course of the Civil War the Soviet Union continued to recognize the Kuomintang regime (the 
Nationalists) while American aid flowed freely to Chiang Kai-shek, only to be dissipated by his corrupt and inefficient 
generals” (Lawrance, 1975). 
Pakistan first pursued a neutral policy without any inclination to power politics and later joined the Western camp. 
Although the Western alliances were against of communism but Pakistan‟s interests were, to defend itself against the 
India. Being a communist state, China aligned itself with the Soviet Union. China formulated its foreign policy toward 
other countries on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Like the other two superpowers, China was also 
ambitious for a footstep in South Asia. China first approached India due to the latter‟s non-aligned policy and a role for 
the cause of the Third World countries. Thus a common ground established for China and India when they signed the 
Panchsheel Agreement in April 1954. In this context, the Sino-Pakistan relations became on low level because of the 
Pakistan‟s alignment with the United States and the China‟s approach with India. China had been criticized the 
Pakistan‟s pro-West policies, but her protests were not as strong as that of the Soviet Union (Hailin, 2008). 
During the Korean War, Pakistan didn‟t label China as an aggressor and repeatedly supported the resolutions for the 
Communist China‟s seat in the United Nations. After joining the US-led Western pacts, Pakistan changed its policy 
regarding the representation of PRC in the UN and China kept a neutral position on the Kashmir issue. A turning point 
was the Bandung Conference when the two states‟ leaders reached on an understanding that despite the Pakistan‟s 
alliance with the West, its policies were not against of China. The pro-West Pakistani leaders, especially the Ayub 
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Khan‟s policies raised some doubts in the Chinese minds but a hope for cordial relations didn‟t drop away. The 
deteriorated Sino-Pakistan relations found a way for upward swing in the late fifties, when the Sino-Indian relations 
deteriorated on their border issue. A further issue of Tibet between China and India, and the worsening Pakistan‟s 
relations with the United States caused for warm Sino-Pakistan relations. The point is important in this regard is that the 
Sino-Pakistan‟s relations started improving in the presence of the same leadership. Although, the revolutionary Chinese 
leadership and the pro-West Pakistani bureaucracy didn‟t change, still the relations started moving in a positive 
direction. Keeping in view the neorealism‟s argument about the international system, the start for cordial Sino-Pakistan 
relations was the direct result of the changing international system.  
2. The Pre-Ayub Years 
2.1 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
“Pakistan was the first Islamic country, second commonwealth and the third non-communist country which recognized 
the People‟s Republic of China on 5 January 1950 and established diplomatic relations on 21 May 1951” (Ali, 2009). 
This was in line of the Pakistan‟s neutral foreign policy in the search of new friends. Despite the fact that Pakistan was a 
Muslim country and China a Communist, the geopolitical considerations and security issues compelled the two states 
for recognition. Thus a base of Sino-Pakistan relations in the context of realpolitik established. Two reasons motivated 
Pakistan for the recognition of the People‟s Republic of China. First was the Chiang Kai-shek‟s Kuomintang policy 
during the Indo-Pakistan independence movement against the British colonialism, when the KMT supported 
anti-Muslim “All India National Congress” party (Vertberger, 1983). This resulted doubt in the minds of the Pakistan‟s 
policy makers about the Chinese Nationalists. Second, the Pakistan‟s relations with India and Afghanistan were not 
friendly; China‟s recognition partly satisfied the Pakistan‟s hopes for its territorial security. Pakistan was enthusiastic for 
friendly relations with the PRC. “When the Chinese Communists took control of China, Pakistan declared that the 
Chinese revolution was an event of the highest importance, an original Asian revolution that had opened a new chapter 
in the history of Asia” (Vertberger, 1983). The People‟s China welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Pakistan, because of the reasons, that China saw Pakistan as a testing case of its Third World policy and also the proof 
that Pakistan was not involved in the Chinese Civil War. It had not taken any side and remained neutral, and had no any 
desire for the sympathy with the Kuomintang (Jain, 1974). 
2.2 Tibet Issue 
After the Chinese Communist Revolution, the PRC was consolidating its control on the Chinese territory. The Tibet 
issue has been a crucial case for the Chinese leaders. To secure its sovereignty, in 1950, the Chinese forces of People‟s 
Liberation Army took a strong action in Tibet. The Chinese action condemned by many countries all over the world, 
including India, which had historical differences with China over the issue. However, the Pakistan‟s Government policy 
was different. It didn‟t react against the PLA. The then Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan expressed that “The 
scene is so far away that I have nothing to say” (Afzal, 1966). Pakistan also declared that it would be neutral in this 
matter, and it drew away itself from the discussions on the Tibetan appeal against the Chinese action in the United 
Nations. The Pakistan‟s policy about the Tibetan issue was in accordance with the security-centric vision. By doing so, 
Pakistan‟s image raised in the Chinese eyes. It was in favor of Pakistan due to the fact that any revolt and chaos in the 
Tibet could destabilize the Eastern part of Pakistan (now Bangladesh). If Pakistan condemned the Chinese action in 
Tibet, India could manipulate the situation in her own favor.  
In the meantime, the Communist China‟s issue of representation in the UN world body debated and dominated the 
world scenario. The Capitalist Western World opposed the Chinese entry to the UN. In the same year, the Pakistan‟s 
permanent delegate to the United Nations, Sir Zafrullah Khan, delivered a strong address in the UN for the seat of 
People‟s Republic of China (Montagno, 1965). 
2.3 Korean War 
Another test for the Sino-Pakistan relations was the War on Korean Peninsula. As the Cold War had already started 
between the capitalist and the communist blocs, being the communist states, the China and the Soviet Union took side 
of the North Korea. The capitalist Western countries supported the South Korea. In the wake of the war on the Korean 
Peninsula, the Western World presented the resolutions in the Security Council of the UN. The Security Council 
consequently passed the resolutions on June 25 and 27, 1950. The United Nations declared North Korea as an aggressor 
and needed a task for reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Although Karachi supported the UN action in Korea to 
bring peace, but did not give any military assistance to Western countries against North Korea. Pakistan gave moral 
support to the Korean problem, by contributing 5,000 tons of food grain. However, it abstained by joining the sixteen 
nations force that participated in the fighting backed by the United Nations, against the Communists (Jain, 1974). 
Pakistan pursued a cautious policy by avoiding labeling the PRC as an aggressor, when the Chinese volunteers crossed 
the Yalu River, and also refused to support economic sanctions against China. Instead, Pakistan became one of the 
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sponsors of the resolution creating a Good Offices Committee to finalize a cease-fire in Korea. 
2.4 Pakistan’s Alliance with the West 
The United States established its relations with Pakistan in 1949. As the Cold War had been started, the two 
superpowers were competing to balance each other in international politics. Thus both, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, welcomed the Pakistan‟s leader to visit either country. Pakistan chose the United States instead of the USSR. 
The ground leveled for friendly US-Pakistan relations, when the Pakistan‟s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan 
visited the United States in May 1950. An agreement concluded for the purchase of the American military equipment, 
scheduled for December, 1950. Under the first technical cooperation agreement of 9 February 1951, Pakistan received a 
total of 500,000 dollars and in 1952, it was granted further sum of 10 million dollars. Further in 1953, the technical aid 
amounted to 34.2 million dollars (Chaudhuri, 1982). With the coming of power of the US Republican Eisenhower 
Administration in 1952, the two countries‟ relations moved forward. Pakistan already committed to become friendly 
with the West, thus it was the first South Asian country which attracted the American interest.  
The strategist of the containment policy of the communism, John Foster Dulles, paid a visit to Pakistan in May 1953. His 
visit was followed by a seven-member House Armed Services Committee visit in October 1953, and one by the Deputy 
Chief the United States Mission in Turkey. Thereafter, the exchange of visits took place by the higher officers of the civil 
and military bureaucracies of Pakistan. The then Pakistan‟s Secretary of Defense, Iskander Mirza, and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan‟s Army, General Ayub Khan, paid visit to a US ally, Turkey. It was preceded by the 
United States‟ invitation to Ayub Khan, to visit the United Sates‟ military installations (Hashmi, 1973). Pakistan and the 
United States signed The Mutual Assistance Defense Agreement on 19 May 1954. In the same year, Pakistan also signed 
the Meddle East Defense Organization (MEDO) with the Turkey, which was already a key ally of the United States. The 
full alliance came into existence when Pakistan signed the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 
1954 and later, the Baghdad Pact (renamed as Central Treaty Organization, CENTO, after the withdrawal of Iraq) in 
February 1955. As Pakistan needed aid for its development of economy and mainly the defense sector, Islamabad received 
a huge amount of U.S. assistance from 1953-1961. Pakistan, in turn, committed itself for restriction of trade relations with 
the socialist countries. This made Pakistan one of the most important security partners of the USA in the period. 
Both the United States and Pakistan came closer to each other by the security considerations. “The main driving force 
behind a nation‟s foreign policy is its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. Pakistan, situated as it is, 
surrounded by hostile neighbors, must seek arrangement guaranteeing its territorial integrity and permitting it to 
preserve its distinct ideological personality” (Bhutto, 1964). Pakistan pursued a regional thinking of security while the 
United States followed its global strategy of regional settings. The geopolitics played a critical role in the formulation of 
the United States‟ policies towards Pakistan as well. Geopolitically, the region of the South Asia has traditionally been 
considered as a unified entity. The location of the South Asia, where Pakistan is also located, has always been important 
for the West. It is located between the energy-rich Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific, and also has borders with both 
Russia and China. The air and the sea routes which connect Europe and the Middle East with the Australasia and Far 
East, pass through the South Asian region or near to it. The region is also has of great significance because of the fact 
that it serves as a bridge between the East Asia and West Asia on the one hand, and East Asia and Central Asia on the 
other hand (Hilali, 2005). The United States had a desire to cement its relations with Pakistan for a strong hold in the 
Middle East against the Soviet Union and China. “Pakistan has traditionally been perceived by the Americans to have a 
strategic position in the Middle East. Its participation in the CENTO alliance in the 1950s was encouraged by the United 
States and Britain with a view to strengthening the oil rich regions around Iran and Turkey” (Subramanian, 1989). 
The main objective of the United States‟ willingness, to allow Pakistan in the Western alliances was the “Containment 
Doctrine”. A former Pakistani Premier Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1969) has best analyzed the Western policy as “Pakistan was 
armed on condition that she, like other countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, entered into alliance in recognition 
of the communist danger and would be prepared to be a part of the world-wide encirclement of the Soviet Union and 
China with the common and collective purpose of containing Communism, if necessary, with the use of force”. United 
States was willing for its hegemony in the region, to block the spread of communism and maintain a permanent 
influential position for future. The United States wanted that by giving military and economic aid to Pakistan, the latter 
could not move to the communist states. It was through these military alliances that the American imperialist agenda 
would continue by formulation and implementation of Pakistan‟s internal and external policies (Chaudhuri, 1982). It 
should be clear that Pakistan‟s joining the Western alliances was primarily due to the Indian threat. Pakistan has had 
hostilities with India embedded in their historical differences. The main issue remained between them is, Kashmir. 
Since the two states had fought war in 1948 on the Kashmir problem, Pakistan viewed India as an aggressor and 
potential threat for its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. According to Chaudhri, although the 
American circles drew Pakistan into its military alliances against the communism, but Pakistan was not concerned about 
this bogey. It tried to utilize the American aid and assistance to get concessions from India on disputed issues. By doing 
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so, at least Pakistan could get its parity with a more powerful state of India. It was therefore believed that, although 
India was Pakistan‟s traditional antagonist, Pakistan nevertheless remained faithful to the United States as its natural 
friend in the fulfillment of its global policies directed against Communism. 
2.5 China’s Reactions 
Pakistan get started its relations with China by a hope for friendly relations; by supporting the Communist China‟s seat 
in the United Nations, its neutral policy during the Chinese control over Tibet and refraining from the Korean War. 
Pakistan‟s entry into the Western alliances, to some extent brought about a hurdle with its relations to China. Although 
Pakistan had not joined the Western security pacts to block the Chinese way but China was unhappy over it (Shisheng, 
2008). George L. Montagno (1965) has commented, “(T)he initial bloom faded somewhat in 1954 when Pakistan 
succumbed to Western allurements and joined SEATO, a defensive regional arrangement aimed primarily to prevent 
Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia”. One of the reasons of the Beijing‟s unhappy attitude towards 
Pakistan, was the latter‟s policy regarding China‟s seat in the United Nations. “On the question of seating the 
Communist government in the United Nations, Pakistan‟s answer and vote was in the affirmative. But after the initial 
vote in favor of the Communist government, Pakistan voted until 1960 for the Western-sponsored resolutions 
postponing consideration of the representation of China. The official reason given was that the government wanted to 
defer a decision on the representation of Communist China until this change was more nearly unanimously favored. 
Actually, the period during which Pakistan voted with the West coincided with the period of closest relations with the 
United States” (Levi, 1962). 
As China hard-won victory over the Nationalists concerned, they were more sensitive to the Western alliances. The PRC 
opposed all kinds of US-sponsored alliances and strategies, and considered them the imperialism‟s tactic to make weak 
the Afro-Asian community. China hoped that Pakistan would not join any Western umbrella of alliances, before the 
latter‟s jumping into such pacts. When the Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra congratulated the Chinese 
Premier on the successful conclusion of Geneva Conference, Chou En-lai expressed the above hopes for Pakistan (New 
China News Agency, 1954). Unfortunately the expressed-hope didn‟t materialize. Pakistan joined the US-led security 
pacts. Vertzberger (1983) outlined the Chinese concerns in the words that, “the Chinese seemed worried by Pakistan‟s 
search for Western economic and military aid, as well as by the U.S. attempt to induce Pakistan to join both the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact to serve as the strategic link between the 
organization, thus welding a so-called military crescent”.  
As these pacts were against of communist states, the Chinese reaction was natural. But for two reasons, the Chinese 
attitude was not as strict as that of the Soviet Union. First was the Chinese understanding of Pakistan‟s assurances, that 
the latter had not join the pacts for the purpose to oppose China, and second was the hope for future better bilateral 
relations. On 10 August 1954, Karachi declared that it would participate in Manila Conference but Pakistan had nothing 
against Beijing, the Pakistan‟s Ambassador in Peking General Agha Muhammad Raza assured his personal friend, Zhou 
En-lai of Pakistan‟s ambitions (Sherwani, 1967). China‟s criticism of alliances was primarily directed against the US for 
having manipulating the security situations of the newly independent Asian states under its “imperialist designs” (Singh, 
1987). However China warned Pakistan‟s disadvantages in the membership of these organizations. The Chinese 
revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong even discarded the ideological pretensions in flirting with Pakistan. Many times 
Beijing expressed its views that it would not object Pakistan for joining the military pacts with the West, unless it stays 
away from any activity directed to the PRC (Chaudhuri, 1982). 
2.6 Indian-Chinese Brothers Era 
The hope for better Sino-Pakistan relations further blurred by the Sino-Indian friendly ties, when they called their 
friendship as “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai”(Indian-Chinese are brothers). Looking to the Pakistan‟s entry into the Western 
alliances and thereafter the warm Sino-Indian relations, a kind of balance of power emerged in South Asia. For Pakistan, 
India was already its adversary and with China, the relations were marginalized. A good opportunity with no option was 
available both for China and India to collaborate with each other. In response to Pakistan‟s seeking Western assistance, 
India replied by the policy to strengthen its relations with the two Communist Powers, especially China (Sherwani, 
1967). China had viewed India as a big country as compare to Pakistan and also had a leading position in the 
Afro-Asian community, by adopting the Non-aligned status and supporting the Communist China‟s seat in the United 
Nations Organization. “India had inherited most of the subcontinent‟s communists – as well as most of its industry, 
ports and educated elite. Therefore no communist-led uprising took place in Pakistan in the years after independence, 
and the country was accorded scant attention by the Chinese in their period of revolutionary militancy” (Barnds, 1975). 
Bhutto (1969) in his book “The Myth of Independence” described: “On 17 October 1949 Prime Minister Nehru 
declared: Inevitably she (India) had to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest, but at the same 
time she brought to it a touch of her idealism. Thus she has tried to combine idealism with national interest. The main 
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objectives of that policy are: The pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but 
through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue”.  
The Chinese also had learned from the Soviet experience of invitation to Pakistan, when the latter decided to visit the 
United States. Already in 1950-51, the Chinese Communist regime had moved toward friendly relations with India and 
not Pakistan (Gupta, 1970). In 1952, 53, and 55, Indian cultural delegations went to China. From 1951 to 1955 eleven 
exhibitions of Chinese art were held in India. From 1952 to 1955, seven exhibitions of Indian art were held in China 
(Kehmu, 1981). The Indian-Chinese brothers‟ period started when the Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai met with an Indian 
delegation in December 1953. During the meeting, Mr. Zhou raised the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; 
namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territory, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other‟s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Later, when the People‟s Republic of China and the 
Republic of India signed an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India in April 
1954, these principles included in it (Yihuang, 2004). Since then, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence remained 
as the corner stone of the Chinese foreign policy. Nehru adopted somewhat a neutral policy toward the two blocs. In 
contrast to Pakistan, he didn‟t want to antagonize any camp, thus maintaining a correct relationship with both. He 
believed that India would gain in the long run if she maintained cordial relations with both the blocs, thus no 
estrangement could attached with India‟s relations to other countries (Baruah, 2004). 
The period is witnessed for suspicions and readjustment of policies by China and Pakistan. Although, their bilateral 
relations were not satisfactory, till both the states tried not to antagonize each other to an extent from where no return 
could happen. It is evident from the fact that when the Chinese Premier visited India in June 1954 with a warm 
reception in New Delhi, “Nehru tried very hard to persuade Premier Chou En Lai to visit Srinager, the Capital of 
disputed Kashmir, but, unlike Premier Khrushev, the Prime Minister of China refused to do so. Despite the good 
relations that existed between China and India and the unsatisfactory state of relations between Pakistan and China, 
India was unable to succeed in making China a tool of her interests” (Bhutto, 1965). According to Zheng Ruixiang 
(2008), Zhou En-lai rejected the Nehru‟s offer and said that Kashmir was a disputed territory. After joining the 
Pakistan‟s Western pacts, the Soviet Union repeatedly committed a stance on the disputed issue of Kashmir in line with 
the Indian position. However, China didn‟t commit such kind of assurance to India, even in the heydays of their 
bilateral relations. “In a book called „Panchsheela and after‟, by Girilal Jain, the author has said: During Mr. Chou 
En-lai‟s visit to India in 1956-57, the Chinese Prime Minister was repeatedly asked to define his Government‟s policy 
on the issue of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Mr. Chou En-lai was, unlike the Soviet leaders, noncommittal. 
This lends some indirect confirmation to unconfirmed reports then prevalent in New Delhi that the Chinese rulers were 
not wholly averse to the idea of having a deal with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue” (Bhutto, 1964). During this time 
period, China and India moved closer to each other. It was a passive response by China to Pakistan and also the desire 
to promote its leading role of the Afro-Asian states.  
2.7 Bandung Conference 
The first large-scale gathering of the Afro-Asian states was held in Bandung (a city of Indonesia) between April 18 and 
April 24, 1955. The participating countries were mostly new-independent states. The Conference was organized by 
Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and India. The main purpose of the conference was to oppose all kinds 
of colonialism, neocolonialism by the United States and the Soviet Union or any other imperialist power, and to 
promote economic and cultural cooperation among these states. A 10-point “Declaration on Promotion of World Peace 
and Cooperation” was adopted unanimously, including the Five Principles of peaceful Coexistence, which were already 
concluded between China and India in 1954 (US Department of State, 2009). 
It was a big opportunity for China and Pakistan to clarify the misconceptions which they had in their minds. The 
understanding between the two countries later proved fruitful. P.L. Bhola (1986) has written on the issue as “(T)here 
had been no high-level China-Pakistan contact until Premier Zhou En-lai met his Pakistani counterpart Mohammed Ali 
Bogra during the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April 1955. It was in Bandung that these two leaders agreed that 
(a) China and India were emerging as rivals for leadership amongst Afro-Asian countries, (b) China and Pakistan should 
cooperate to increase their leverage against Moscow and New Delhi, and (c) China and Pakistan could evolve a working 
relationship despite differences in their political systems and ideologies”.  
Both the leaders were satisfied by their discussions in the conference. The Chinese Government which so far was 
doubtful and unhappy about Pakistan‟s engagement with the West realized the past assurances of Karachi to Beijing. 
Zhou En-lai, while referring to his Pakistani counterpart Mohammed Ali Bogra, professed in the Political Committee of 
the Conference on 23 April 1955: “He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not 
against China. The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the U.S. should take aggressive action under the 
military treaty or if the U.S. launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it….I am grateful to him for this 
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explanation, because through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding” (Cohen, 1955). Before the 
Bandung Conference, some differences had developed between China and India, mainly on the question of the 
leadership of the Afro-Asian states. The Soviet Union was also getting closer to India for the purpose to upset the 
Pakistan‟s alliance with the United States, as Moscow had already warned Pakistan for her commitment with the West. 
India was naturally disappointed with the outcomes of the conference. Actually, Nehru was working for another kind of 
Afro-Asian community that was the non-aligned states. Nehru‟s policy did not come into reality, to stop China and 
Pakistan, both aligned states, to cooperate with each other (Sherwani, 1967). The Bandung Conference became a 
watershed in Sino-Pakistan relations in such a manner that since their understanding in the conference, high-level visits, 
including those of the Prime Ministers took place.  
2.8 Exchange of Visits 
During the Bandung diplomacy, Zhou En-lai extended invitation to Mohammed Ali Bogra, to visit China. The Bogra‟s visit 
didn‟t materialize because he was removed. His successor Choudhry Muhammad Ali too didn‟t go for journey to China 
due to the domestic reasons. Finally, H.S. Suhrawardy, the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, paid an official visit to China 
in October 1956. The Chinese premier reciprocated the visit to Pakistan in December the same year. The joint statement of 
the two Prime Ministers issued on 23 October 1956 stressed for need to foster the cultural and commercial relations 
between the two countries. Another joint statement on 24 December 1956 mentioned about the same objectives. The two 
leaders also expressed that the different political systems and divergent views on many issues should not be a hurdle to 
their bilateral relations. The visits confirmed that there was no real conflict of interests between the two countries. At the 
same time, Pakistan didn‟t want to lose friendship with United States at the expanse of China. “Soon after his visit to China, 
Mr. Suhrawardy went to the United States and made some statements which were taken amiss by China” (Bhutto, 1965).  
Although the cultural and commercial ties developed then, the two countries avoided to support each other on political 
problems, such as Kashmir and the PRC‟s seat in the United Nations. During the Chinese Premier‟s visit to Pakistan, he 
commented on Kashmir problem as the creation of imperialism, exploited by the West in order to make the Asian unity 
paralyzed. Pakistan was looking forward for the Chinese moral support on the issue, but the neutral position of Zhou 
En-lai disappointed the Pakistani leaders (Montagno, 1965). By adopting a neutral position on Kashmir issue, Beijing 
didn‟t want to antagonize New Delhi and hoped for better relations with it. China was of the desire to see Pakistan 
moving far away from the Western alliances and finally could withdraw from the pacts. Accordingly, “(T)he PRC‟s 
policy was to call on both sides – India and Pakistan – to settle the problem through bilateral negotiations. Such a 
settlement would extricate China from the continuous pressure being applied by Pakistan and India and, at the same 
time, would reduce or even eliminate Pakistan‟s need for U.S. military, political, and even economic support. According 
to Chinese calculations, Pakistan could then withdraw altogether from the Western alliance system” (Vertzberger, 1983). 
Gurnam Singh (1987) has further analyzed the statement: “At a time when China was dependent on the Soviet Union 
for economic, military and technological aid, it was pretty difficult for her to take a stand on an important international 
issue in direct opposition to that of the Soviet Union”. The goodwill visits of Zhou En-lai and Suhrawardy hindered by 
the Pakistan‟s excessive dependence on the United States for her military and economic needs. The July 1957 visit of 
Suhrawardy to the US created further misconceptions and doubts in China‟s mind. “Apart from his known pro-West 
leanings, the motivations for Suhrawardy‟s anti-communist and anti-China diatribe are not far to seek. He was 
impressed by the unequivocal and forthright support of the Nationalist China (Taiwan) delegate in the Security Council 
on the question of Kashmir in January 1957, which was in direct contrast to Zhou‟s intransigent stand on the issue. 
Moreover, Suhrawardy‟s hobnobbing with Zhou had come to be severely criticized in the US and the Eisenhover 
Administration was under pressure from the Democrats and Republicans alike to check Pakistan from going ahead in its 
venture” (Ibid. p. 14). Thereafter, Pakistan again voted against the Communist China‟s representation in the World Body. 
It was in line of her ally, the US. The Chinese press, which was the mouth-piece of the Chinese Government protested 
and condemned the Pakistan‟s stands against China (Ibid. p. 15). The most unacceptable action of Pakistan for China 
was the visit of a prominent member of Pakistan‟s delegation to the United Nations‟ General Assembly session of 1957 
to Taiwan in a semi-official capacity (Bhutto, 1965). 
These developments of Sino-Pakistan relations in pre-Ayub Khan years was the product, of both the domestic political 
changes and international system. In the case of the PRC, nothing changed domestically (the leadership was the same), 
while the Pakistani internal policies of the parties affected the bilateral relations of China and Pakistan. As the Pakistani 
leaders belonged to the pro-West parties, especially, the H.S. Suhrawardy, which was Prime Minster of a pro-West; the 
Republican Party. However, the “non-cordial” relations were more affected by international system, in a way, when 
Pakistan was totally dependent on the US. 
3. The Ayub Khan Years (Up to 1960) 
The Sino-Pakistan relations during the Ayub‟s initial years were sinking because of the Ayub‟s one-sided policy and its 
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leaning to the West. General Ayub‟s pro-West personality was already came to test, when he entered into the 
Muhammad Ali Bogra‟s Federal Cabinet in 1954 as Commander-in-Chief, given a portfolio of Defense, and negotiated 
the Pakistan‟s joining the US-sponsored military alliances. On October 7 1958, Pakistan‟s President Iskandar Mirza 
dissolved the National Assembly of Malik Feroze Khan Noon, declared first Martial Law in the country and appointed 
C-in-C General Muhammad Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Later, on 27 October 1959, 
Ayub Khan took power from Iskandar Mirza and became the President of Pakistan as well (Khan, 2008). The new 
Administration in Karachi expressed for a balanced policy and remedies to its relations with Socialist states. With the 
imposition of the Martial Law in the country, Pakistan stressed for “desire to have friendly relations with all nations” 
and denounced the “political adventures” for producing “bad blood and misunderstandings” between Pakistan and 
countries like the USSR, the UAR and the People‟s Republic of China (Khan, 1967). 
Beijing didn‟t welcome the new regime in Pakistan. China had already known the West-oriented mentality of the 
“alliances‟ architect”, Mr. Ayub Khan. Soon after assuming office, while the foreign policy of Pakistan was being 
reviewed in a Cabinet meeting on 22 December 1958, Ayub Khan maintained: “there was not much room for flexibility 
in our foreign policy…it was a fact that we needed aid and, therefore, we should not behave in a manner which would 
annoy those who give us aid for the development and security of our country. The aid given to us by the U.S.A. was 
aimed at helping us maintain independence in an area which was threatened by Communism” (Singh, 1987).  
On the question of Formosa (Taiwan), Pakistan didn‟t support the Communist China‟s claim. “The Martial Law 
Proclamation by President Iskandar Mirza on 7 October 1958 synchronized with the strongest protest note from China 
denouncing the Pakistani reply of 1 October 1958, wherein Pakistan had maintained that the [juridical position of 
sovereignty over Formosa] was [not clear]. It further maintained that [the problem should therefore be settled by 
peaceful negotiations. The wishes of the local inhabitants should be give due consideration” (Bhutto, 1976). The 
political unrest in both countries further deteriorated their relations. Vertzberger (1983) has concluded the factors, 
responsible for weak Sino-Pakistan relations in the following words. “By 1958, Sino-Pakistani relations began to 
deteriorate. China‟s foreign policy became generally more radical and less tolerant of reactionary regimes such as that 
of Pakistan. This was further complicated by four factors: the coming to power of the Pakistani military under the 
leadership of Ayub Khan, who was known for his pro-Western, anti-Communist sentiments; Pakistan‟s signing of a 
bilateral agreement of cooperation with the United States; Pakistan‟s sympathy for the revolt in Tibet; and General 
Ayub‟s plan for the defense of the subcontinent”. Along with the Karachi‟s sustained support to the West against of the 
PRC‟s representation in the UN, Pakistan‟s entry into another agreement with the United States and the Tibet situation 
brought the two countries to the lowest level of their bilateral relations. Pakistan still feared the Indian threat and 
insisted for a new agreement. Thus it concluded an agreement of cooperation on security with the United States in 
March 1959. United States was agreed to protect Pakistan‟s independence and territorial integrity, and in the case of 
grave situations, it would commit itself to use armed forces for the sake of Pakistani Government. Beijing was more 
concerned to the Pakistan‟s new agreement with the United States. 
In an article in an American journal Ayub Khan (1960) stated: “Moreover, in the context of present day world politics 
Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West, and unlike several other countries around us, we have 
shut ourselves off completely from the possibility of any major assistance from the Communist bloc. We do not believe 
in hunting with the hound and running with the hare. We wish to follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguous 
path”. Again Pakistan supported the Western resolution in the UN for sympathy with the Tibetans in October 1959. 
Pakistan‟s representative in the UN General Assembly, Prince Aly Khan, stated in his brief speech about the Tibet issue.  
3.1 Ayub’s Proposal for Joint Defense of Subcontinent 
General Ayub Khan proposed India a joint defense of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent on 24 April 1959. Pakistan‟s 
Ambassador in Washington, Aziz Ahmad repeated the proposal on 30 April 1959. Nehru rejected the proposal on 4 May 
1959. Ayub‟s proposal for joint defense of the subcontinent with India was for the purpose, to halt the northern 
communist neighbors (Soviet Union and China) from the expansion toward Indian Ocean. India rejected the proposal on 
two bases. First, Ayub made it conditional on a solution of the Kashmir problem, which India had viewed it as favorable 
to Pakistan, and second, India did not consider any such threat from the north (Vertzberger, 1983). Due to the 
deteriorating Sino-Indian relations of the border issue and India‟s granting political asylum to Dalai Lama and his 
followers, Karachi grasped the opportunity for a joint front with India. When Mr. Nehru spoke in Indian Parliament on 
28 August 1959, that China had overrun the Indian border post of Longju and expressed his anxiety about the 
Sino-Indian border, Pakistan‟s President M. Ayub Khan rushed for a meeting with Indian Prime Minister. The two 
leaders briefly met on 1
st
 September 1959 at New Delhi airport and Ayub Khan repeated his previous offer of 
cooperation between India and Pakistan to defend the subcontinent (Sherwani, 1980). 
Apart from the threat concern, Pakistan had also believed that in the case of joint defence of India and Pakistan, India 
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would not be in a position to criticize the Western aid, especially the military assistance to Pakistan. As the Pakistan‟s 
purpose of joining the alliances was primarily to balance itself with India, India had always opposed it. It was one of the 
major foreign policy goals of the Indian government to halt the Western inflow of military and economic assistance to 
Pakistan. By the idea of joint defense of the subcontinent, United States could provide more assistance to Pakistan, as 
she considered it an accurate way to halt the communism‟s spread toward South Asia and warm waters of the Indian 
Ocean. Ayub Khan tried his best to get more help from the Washington and other Western capitals for the security and 
development of Pakistan.  
3.2 Chinese Reaction 
The PRC reacted to Pakistan‟s all pro-West actions but relatively in a milder tone than that of the Soviet Union. Beijing 
was well aware of the Pakistan‟s internal political configuration and its total dependence on West. The Chinese protests 
to Pakistan were soft because of the hope that in future their bilateral relations could move in a positive direction. It was 
already during the Bandung Conference when misunderstandings had removed from the scene between the two 
countries, and China knew the compulsions of Pakistan‟s joining the Western alliances. The PRC had often blamed the 
United States for such motives to compel the newly-independent nations of Asia and Africa and exploit their poor 
conditions. The leaders of the Communist China also knew the growing suspicions and upcoming hostilities of itself 
and Pakistan with India and the Soviet Union. It did not agitate to the irreparable extent, from where the Sino-Pakistan 
relations could not come to track. China pursued a policy of watch and wait about Pakistan and the regional power 
politics of South Asia. 
China had officially protested to Pakistan‟s policies through the diplomatic channel. Although the Beijing regime was 
familiar with Ayub Khan‟s pro-West policies but it had been avoiding an open confrontation with Pakistan, in the view 
of the possibility, of a US plan for a joint Indo-Pakistan front against China (Singh, 1987). It was later the joint defense 
of the subcontinent‟s idea, which China cautiously criticized.  
Speaking on the cautious position of China regarding Pakistan‟s West supported policies, Gurnam Singh (1987) has 
remarked: “Therefore, China, from time to time, lodged protest notes through diplomatic channels, so as to avoid a 
permanent damage to their mutual relationship and not to spoil the popular goodwill, which the 1956 visits of the two 
premiers and subsequent goodwill missions had created in the past two years. Perhaps China was aware of the fragile 
nature of the successive regimes in Pakistan and their excessive dependence on the US for economic and military aid”. 
Leadership in Beijing watched carefully the regional power politics and always kept in mind its policy toward other 
states. “In its protests, criticism and warnings to Pakistan, China, never lost sight of her deteriorating relationship with 
India and the Soviet Union. Pakistan‟s usefulness, as a regional counterweight to India and as a continuous, source of 
embarrassment to the Soviet Union, remained uppermost in Chinese strategy even during these dark days of 
Sino-Pakistan relationship. China‟s reactions during this phase were moderated by its understanding of Pakistan‟s 
dysfunctional syndrome in the wake of her not too happy relationships with Afghanistan and India. The Soviet 
relationship with these two neighbors of Pakistan had been a major factor in determining Pakistan‟s foreign policy 
towards other countries” (Ibid. pp. 27-28). 
4. Conclusion 
At the end of 1950s, international system changed in such a way that hostilities between China and India, and 
Sino-Soviet antagonism opened the eyes of leaders in Karachi as well as in Peking. New Delhi‟s close ties with 
Moscow further intensified the Chinese anger. China maintained its ideological and geopolitical antagonism towards 
Soviet revisionism and social imperialism (Barnds, 1975). Although China was unhappy of the Pakistan‟s alignment 
with the West, but the two countries avoid hostilities to each other for better future relationship. That‟s why; China 
maintained a neutral policy on Kashmir. On the other hand, Ayub Khan‟s regime felt the Indian gesture of 
non-cooperation and hostile policies of the Soviet Union. Despite the Western military and economic assistance to 
Pakistan, it was in despair about the US‟ commitment of alliances, as no guarantee had been given to Pakistan against 
the Indian aggression. Pakistan, due to its complexities had accepted the Western pacts, but not whole-heartedly. These 
factors compelled Ayub Khan to review its policy and Pakistan proposed to China the demarcation of their mutual 
boundary in January 1960. 
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